

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 171303

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 4918 ACTION SECSTATE INFO NICOSIA,
USUN, BONN, COPENHAGEN, LONDON, PARIS, AND ATHENS DATED
JULY 5, 1978.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 4918

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, TU, CY, UN
SUBJECT: STIMULATING MOVEMENT ON VAROSHA
REF: STATE 161686

1. TULUMEN CALLED DCM AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR TO
FOREIGN MINISTRY MORNING JULY 4 TO PRESENT GOT REPLY
TO OUR INFORMAL PAPER ON VAROSHA. TULUMEN MADE FEW
PRELIMINARY REMARKS, STRESSING: (1) THIS WAS TURKISH
CONTRIBUTION TO LIFTING EMBARGO AND "STEP FORWARD" FROM
PREVIOUS TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS; (2) PAPER HAD BEEN
APPROVED BY PRIME MINISTER AND COULD ONLY BE AMENDED BY
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#HIM; (3) TURKEY WISHED TO "HELP" UNSYG WALDHEIM WHO
HAD FALLEN "INTO HESITATION"; (4) IT WAS ESSENTIAL WALDHEIM
USE THE PAPER PROPERLY, I.E., MAKE AN OPEN CALL TO BOTH
COMMUNITIES TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN PAPER (IF
WALDHEIM INSISTED ON "OCONSULTINGZ GREEK CYPRIOTS BEFOREHAND,
PAPER WOULD LOSE VALIDITY); (5) THERE WAS NO "FAT" IN PAPER;
(6) IN ORDER TO BE USEFUL TO USG, WALDHEIM OBVIOUSLY
SHOULD USE THE PAPER BY 10-12 JULY IN ORDER TO HAVE IT IN
PLAY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE
FOLLOWING WEEK.

2. TEXT OF PAPER: QTE 1. IN HIS MAY 31, 1978 REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS, SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM OBSERVED THAT "THE TIME MAY BE RIPE FOR A CONCRETE ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE EXISTING STALEMATE ON THE GROUND, THUS CREATING AN OPENING FOR FURTHER SIGNIFICANT STEPS. THE STATUS OF VAROSHA, WHICH OBVIOUSLY SHOULD NOT BE KEPT IN ITS PRESENT EMPTY AND DECAYING CONDITION, MAY PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS KIND. SINCE VAROSHA IS SITUATED IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE BUFFER ZONE, IT WOULD SEEM NATURAL TO ENVISAGE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE IN THIS CONNECTION.

2. TGE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD ALREADY INDICATED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT INHABITANTS OF VAROSHA WOULD BE ABLE TO BEGIN RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES AND PROPERTIES IN THE CITY AS SOON AS THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE RECONVENED. THEY HAVE SPECIFIED THAT AS MANY AS 35,000 GREEK CYPRIOTS CAN THUS BE RESETTLED COMMENCING SHORTLY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED IN DEFINING THE AREA OF RESETTLEMENT AND ESTABLISHING THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS THEREIN. THE CONFIDENTIAL

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TURKISH SIDE HAS MADE IT CLEAR, MOREOVER, THAT THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF VAROSHA IS FULLY OPEN TO NEGOTIATION. IN CONJUNCTION THESE ELEMENTS REPRESENT A CONSTRUCTIVE OPENING POSITION, EXPRESSIVE OF TURKISH CYPRIOT GOOD WILL AND SINCERITY.

3. WITH THE ABOVE IN MIND, THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS ARE HEREBY MADE:

PENDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT AND UPON THE RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON THE BASIS OF DENKTAS-MAKARIOS AGREEMENT OF 12 FEBRUARY 1977, AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SHALL BE SET UP IN VAROSHA WITHOUT ANY PREJUDICE EITHER TO THE EXISTING TURKISH CYPRIOT JURISDICTION OVER THE AREA OR TO THE FINAL POLITICAL STATUS THEREOF. THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WHICH WILL FUNCTION UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE UNFICYP SHALL BE COMPOSED OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WHO WILL SETTLE IN THE AREA, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION AND THE UNFICYP.

THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION'S ORGANS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH SHALL INCLUDE THE SUPERVISION OF ESSENTIAL MUNICIPAL SERVICES AND THE EXERCISE OF NORMAL POLICE FUNCTIONS SHALL BE DETERMINED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION AND THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE.

4. THE RESETTLEMENT OF VAROSHA SHALL PROCEED BY STAGES, WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT UP TO 15,000 PERSONS WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE

RESUMPTION OF MEANINGFUL AND RESULT-ORIENTED NEGOTIATIONS. THE UNITED NATIONS SHALL PROVIDE SUCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO SURVEY AND REHABILITATE THE CITY'S INFRASTRUCTURE AND BUILDINGS AND TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF RESETTLEMENT. UNQTE.

3. TULUMEN CLARIFIED FOLLOWING POINTS RAISED BY EMBOFFS:

A. FIGURE OF 15,000 IN PARA 4 IS A TEMPORARY TARGET, NOT UPPER LIMIT WHICH STILL 35,000. HE COMMENTED
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THAT HE AND OTHERS FORESAW MANY PHYSICAL PROBLEMS IN RESTORATION OF VAROSHA AND FEARED SIX MONTHS MIGHT BE OPTIMISTIC. HED ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT GOT WAS PREPARED TO MOUNT "CRASH" PROGRAM IF PROPOSALS ACCEPTED.

B. "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WHO ARE IN THE AREA" MEANT JUST THAT, I.E., REPRESENTATIVES NOT OF GREEK CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT BUT PEOPLE ACTUALLY LIVING IN VAROSHA. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID GOT WOULD INSIST THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE AGREED TO FIRST BY THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION AND UN, FOLLOWING WHICH GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE.

C. THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION AND THE UNSYG MENTIONED IN THE SECOND PROPOSAL COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. THE ACTUAL SETTING UP OF THE ADMINISTRATION, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AS DESCRIBED IN THE PAPER.

4. TULUMEN SAID THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL TO PAPER BECAUSE IT WAS FEARED THAT TO RELINQUISH VAROSHA TO UN ADMINISTRATION MEANT GIVING UP TURKEY'S MOST IMPORTANT BARGAINING CHIP. PESSIMISTS IN THE MINISTRY FEARED THAT WITH VAROSHA GONE THERE WOULD BE NO INCENTIVE FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO BARGAIN AND THE RESULT WOULD BE A STALEMATE.

5. COMMENT:

A. IN ITS BASIC APPROACH, THIS PAPER SEEMS TO HAVE MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS OF LAST APRIL: IT IS CAUTIOUS AND NON-COMMITTAL ON SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO THE POINT OF APPEARING NON-FORTHCOMING, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT OFFERS THE POSITIVE VALUE OF SKETCHING OUT A BARE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERIM
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ADMINISTRATION ARE OPEN TO NEGOTIATION. THE PAPER ENTAILS MORE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN OUR PROPOSALS THAN THE PRIMIN HAD LED US TO BELIEVE. WE HAD PROPOSED THAT THEY UNILATERALLY TURN OVER VAROSHA'S ADMINISTRATION TO THE

UN; THEY COUNTER WITH AN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE UN A TRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATION. THIS POSITION IS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR THEME THAT "EVERYTHING IS NEGOTIABLE"; AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD PRESERVE SOME TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OF VAROSHA SO AS TO PLACATE THOSE ON THE TURKISH SIDE WHO SEE HANDLING OVER VAROSHA TO THE UN AS A SURRENDER OF TURKISH LEVERAGE WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND THEREFORE AS WEAKENING CHANCES FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

B. DISAPPOINTED AS WE MAY BE WITH THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC, GENEROUS OFFERS, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE PAPER INVOLVES A CONSIDERABLE ADVANCE OVER PREVIOUS TURKISH PROPOSALS ON VAROSHA, AND IS A FORWARD STEP THAT CAN BE PUT TO GOOD USE, BOTH AS A SPUR TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AS A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO OUR EFFORTS WITH CONGRESS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE ARE THREE ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION FOR DEALING WITH THIS PAPER, ALL OF WHICH ARE AFFECTED BY THE SHORTNESS OF TIME:

(1) PASS IT TO WALDHEIM WITHOUT IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMEND THAT HE CALL ON THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT IT. ONE ADVANTAGE OF THIS COURSE IS THAT IT WOULD GET THE US OUT OF THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING IMPROVEMENTS BETWEEN THE TURKS AND WALDHEIM. ANOTHER IS THAT IT WOULD REPRESENT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE TURKISH REQUEST. FURTHERMORE, IT IS BARELY POSSIBLE THAT WALDHEIM WOULD COOPERATE. HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THE PROSPECTS OF WALDHEIM'S GOING ALONG ARE SLIM. HIS INSTINCT MAY BE TO TRY TO CONSULT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS BEFOREHAND AND, INEVITABLY, EITHER TO NEGOTIATE THE PAPER FURTHER OR NOT TO PROCEED WITH IT ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE WILL NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. SINCE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD SEE THE PAPER AS AT LEAST IN PART A MOVE TO FACILITATE LIFTING THE EMBARGO, CONFIDENTIAL

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THERE IS NO REASON TO EXPECT THEIR COOPERATION. THE BEST FALLBACK WE SEE AT THAT POINT WOULD BE TO URGE DENKTASH TO PROMULGATE THE PROPOSAL AS PART OF A UNILATERAL STATEMENT SUPPLEMENTING HIS STATEMENT OF MAY 22. IF THIS FALLBACK IS USED, THE STATEMENT WOULD NEED TO BE ISSUED SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE SO THAT CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORTERS OF EMBARGO REPEAL CAN MAKE THE BEST USE OF IT.

(2) RECOMMEND TO WALDHEIM AND THE TURKS THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS BE USED ONLY FOR THE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THE UN ON THE SHAPE OF PROPOSALS FOR A SHARED ADMINISTRATION OF VAROSHA. IF, IN THE DEPARTMENT'S JUDGMENT, THE TURKISH PAPER DOES NOT OFFER ENOUGH TO PERSUADE WALDHEIM TO COMMIT HIS OWN PRESTIGE, A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT IN NICOSIA BY DENKTASH AND GALINDO-POHL WOULD HAVE A LESSER BUT STILL HELPFUL IMPACT, IMPARTING SOME SENSE OF MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS COURSE WOULD HAVE THE FURTHER ADVANTAGE OF NOT REQUIRING

GREEK CYPRIOT APPROVAL AT THIS STAGE.

(3) MOVE RAPIDLY TO SEEK TURKISH ACQUIESCENCE
IN IMPROVING THEIR PAPER SO AS TO PROVIDE WALDHEIM AN
ADEQUATE BASIS FOR ISSUING THE CALL THE TURKS WANT. THE
ADVANTAGE OF THIS COURSE -- IF IT WERE SUCCESSFUL -- IS
THAT IT WOULD RAISE TO A MAXIMUM THE CHANCES OF SUCCEEDING
BOTH IN SPURRING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND IN MAKING A
FAVORABLE IMPACT ON CONGRESSMEN. ALTHOUGH WE TAKE
SERIOUSLY TURKISH STATEMENTS THAT THERE IS NO NEGOTIATING
ROOM IN THEIR TEXT, THERE MAY BE SOME SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENTS.
ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO RE-INSERT THE STATEMENT THAT
THE AREA OF UNFICYP JURISDICTION WOULD INCLUDE THE AREA BETWEEN
VAROSHA'S SOUTHERN CITY LIMITS AND THE DIVIDING LINE.
THE DISADVANTAGES OF SEEKING IMPROVEMENTS INCLUDE: (A) INVOLVING
THE US IN WHAT PROBABLY SHOULD BE A TURKISH-UN (OR TURKISH-
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GREEK CYPRIOT) NEGOTIATION; (B) USING UP TIME; AND (C)
STRAINING ECEVIT'S LIMITED ABILITY TO BE GENEROUS IN HIS
HANDLING OF THE TURKS' MOST IMPORTANT BARGAINING CHIP.

C. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO EVALUATE THE PRACTICALITY
OF THESE COURSES, SINCE THE DEPARTMENT IS IN A MUCH BETTER
POSITION TO ESTIMATE WHAT IS NEEDED TO PERSUADE WALDHEIM.
OUR PREFERENCE IN TERMS OF EASE OF RELATIONS WITH THE TURKS
WOULD BE THE FIRST OPTION; HOWEVER, IF THAT OPTION WOULD
LEAD INEVITABLY TO A FALLBACK ON A SIMPLE STATEMENT BY
DENKTASH, ONE OF THE OTHER OPTIONS MIGHT BE PREFERABLE.

D. PLEASE KEEP IN MIND THAT THIS PAPER WAS PERSONALLY
CLEARED BY THE PRIMIN AND THAT ANY ACTION WE TAKE ON IT WILL
HAVE HIS PERSONAL INTEREST. IF OPTIONS 2 OR 3 ARE PURSUED,
WE RECOMMEND THAT OUR POSITION BE CONVEYED VIA A PERSONAL
MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO ECEVIT.
SPIERS UNQUOTE VANCE

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